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Dora Kostakopoulou’s proposal to disentangle European citizenship from Member
States nationalities is legally dysfunctional. Member States never agreed to grant
European citizens an absolute right to free movement within the European Union
(EU) territory. Thus, in case of a public policy breach, or lack of sufficient resources,
citizens can be expelled by their host state to their state of nationality. Accordingly,
the whole framework regulating mobility within the Union hinges upon Member
States’ nationality status – in accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC. Therefore, a
European citizenship model autonomous from Member States’ nationality cannot
work within the context of free movement. Should we end the debate, then, and take
Richard Bellamy’s side? Not necessarily. Dora Kostakopoulou’s Eurozenship can be
both improved and approved, and below I offer a few options for doing it.
The first (sensitive) option: full freedom of
movement for every European citizen
The first option to make Eurozenship functional is to give citizens unconditional
freedom of movement within the EU territory. This would involve removing every
limitation, such as sufficient resources or respect for the public policy. In other words,
every citizen would have, by design, an absolute right to settle wherever he or she
wants, for an indefinite period. Is this feasible? In principle “yes,” subject to the need
to extend the right of permanent residence to every European citizen (irrespective
of the length of residence) and repeal the restrictions related to public policy, public
security, and public health. It would require a few amendments to the Directive
2004/38/CE that the Parliament and the Council could carry on. Is this politically
achievable in the current state of affairs? Probably not.
Such a move, from limited to absolute freedom of movement, already occurred
in other associations of states. In the United States, the Supreme Court ruled
that states could restrict freedom of movement, for instance, to avoid “the moral
pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts”1)New York v. Miln, 36 U.S.
102 (1837), at 142 (see here). . A century later, in 1941, the Court overturned its
judgment, holding that states were no longer able to limit the freedom of movement
– “the peoples of the several States must sink or swim together”2)Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), at. 174 (Justice Byrne quotes Cardozzo) (see here).
. Similarly, in Switzerland, the Federal Constitution used to give every Canton the
right to expel convicted or indigent citizens. Until 1943, the Canton of Geneva was
still strongly in favour of such restrictions, fearing to become “a garbage filled with
individuals considered undesirable elsewhere”3)Septième rapport du Conseil fédéral
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sur les mesures propres à assurer la sécurité du pays, BOAF, 1943. II. 164 (see
here). . In 1975, however, the Helvetic Confederation abolished all limitations to the
freedom of movement by referendum and established thereby in the Constitution
that “[E]very Swiss citizen can settle in any place in the country.” These two cases
illustrate how federal solidarity can (slowly) evolve and progress.
What is the EU situation: Is it reaching a point close to the United States in 1941,
or Switzerland in 1975? There is no definitive answer to this question, but some
evidence suggests that distance still needs to be covered. Member States are
still using deportation measures to remove European citizens. In some cases,
deportation policies are widely advertised, such as France’s removal of Roma
populations, Germany’s ban on “social tourism”, or Belgium’s deportation of Spanish
citizens. Below the surface, data shows that thousands of European citizens are
quietly expelled by host Member States on economic or public policy grounds
every year4)Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Obstacles to the right of free
movement and residence for EU citizens and their families, 2016, PE 571. 375, 158
p. (see here).. It seems relatively easy to consider a European citizen as an ordinary
“foreigner” rather than a “fellow-citizen”. Hence, a legislative move toward absolute
freedom of movement seems rather unlikely.
The second (practicable) option: a “rescue residence” linked to Eurozenship
The second option to make Eurozenship functional is to create a “rescue residence”
to determine a Member State responsibility for receiving a European citizen without
(European) nationality who would have been expelled by a host Member State. This
path is well known to young or weak federations with limited freedom of movement.
In the United States, freedom of movement used to operate within a framework
set up by “settlement laws”. The model came from Elizabethan England and its
notorious “poor laws”. Citizens were able to claim a right of settlement in a certain
state after a given period without using social assistance (the length varied across
states, from one to five years)5)Daniel R. Mandelker, Settlement Requirement in
General Assistance, 1955 Wash. U. L. Q. 355 (see here). . Once the settlement
was established in a given state, the latter would normally be chosen as a return
destination in case of deportation by another state. Likewise, the Confederal and
then Imperial Germany recognised a similar principle. The Law of 6 June 1870
provided a two-year delay to acquire a “rescue residence” (Unterstützungswohnsitz)
in a local community in charge of social assistance and repatriation6)Gesetz über
den Unterstützungswohnsitz, 6 June 1870, BGBl. S. 360. .
Could a similar disposition be built into Dora Kostakopoulou’s proposed scheme?
Indeed, it could. It is possible to link the autonomous acquisition of European
citizenship to the acquisition of a first rescue residence. In other words, residence
in a specific state would not only allow individuals to get European citizenship, but
also to establish a “rescue residence” in that state. Accordingly, every Member State
welcoming foreigners long enough to enable them to obtain European citizenship
would be, at the same time, responsible for them – should another Member State
want to deport them on economic or public policy grounds. Practically, this would
only require amending Directive 2004/38EC by specifying that European citizens
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who do not hold the nationality of a Member State could be deported in the State of
rescue residence.
To conclude: no (more) reason to oppose an autonomous Eurozenship
The critical question would remain whether to adopt this new kind of European
citizenship disentangled from Member State nationalities. Then, this “rescue
residence” not only fixes the Eurozenship and the question of free movement, but
it helps to take a stand. First, this new category of European citizens would not
be some sort of “weightless” citizens; on the contrary, they would have a strong
link with an identified Member State through their rescue residence. Hence, this
would be one way to eliminate the risk of “the erosion of solidarity within states” that
Richard Bellamy rightly raises to oppose Dora Kostakopoulou’s proposal. Second, I
consider residency the most appropriate proxy for establishing a person’s belonging.
Therefore, I see no reason to oppose Dora Kostakopoulou’s idea that residence or
domicile should be “the main criterion for the acquisition of EU citizenship” – even if
I would rather choose the ten-year delay of the European Convention on Nationality
(art. 6, 3.).
What is next? The federal debate cannot be avoided. Yet, it is no longer taboo to
state that the EU is already a Federation7)Here I rely on Olivier Beaud, Théorie de
la Fédération (Paris: PUF, 2007).. The adoption of this new kind of citizenship would
only lead EU’s federal attributions to deepen, and certainly not to change its very
nature. One should also remember that in 1913, the German Empire implemented a
new “direct” imperial citizenship (“unmittelbare Reichsangehörigkeit”), to be granted
by the Chancellor of the Empire, alongside with the old way of access through the
federal states’ citizenship (“Staatsangehörigkeit in einem Bundesstaat”)8)Reichs- und
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, 22 July 1913, RGBl. S. 583.. In fact, the broad picture
suggests that the terms of this debate are hardly unique in history. The United
States, Germany and Switzerland cases (at least) show that sooner or later, the EU
will face both the question of autonomous federal citizenship and free movement of
citizens. Dora Kostakopoulou’s proposal, packed with a “rescue residence” system,
is, I believe, a good compromise. The next move is political, and it would be left to
the sovereign discretion of the European people and their representatives – probably
not tomorrow, “but it is worth giving a try”9)See Dimitris Christopoulos’ contribution..
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